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Transcendence
J oan Stambaugh
Currently it would appear that transcendence is out of fashion, outdated. Martin Buber expresses this situation in his book 
Eclipse o f  God by quoting from Sartre’s book Situations:
This silence of the transcendent, combined with the persever­
ance of the religious need in modern man, that is the great 
concern today as yesterday. It is the problem which torments 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Jaspers.1
Needless to say, the situation has worsened considerably by now.
I should like to discuss two twentieth century thinkers who attempt­
ed to think transcendence in a completely nontraditional way. Those 
thinkers are Karl Jaspers and Nishitani Keiji of the so-called Kyoto 
school of philosophy. Of course, the kind of transcendence they think 
cannot be said to be the same; but I believe there is a definite com­
patibility and perhaps even an affinity. What Jaspers and Nishitani 
have in common is that their kind of transcendence is not to be found 
beyond this world. We might call it provisionally a nonmetaphysical 
transcendence.
But the label is not important. Given the limited scope of this essay I
1 Martin Buber, Eclipse o f  God (New York: 1957), p. 67.
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shall confine myself primarily to Philosophy o f  Existence of Jaspers 
and to the article “ The Personal and the Impersonal in Religion** of 
Nishitani.
Jaspers* main objection to religion’s treatment of transcendence is 
that it tends to objectify transcendence in fixed symbols which are dog­
matically proclaimed. In good Kantian fashion Jaspers states that all 
ontology is to be rejected.
For ontology, everything was only what thought conceives it 
to be; for philosophizing, everything is simultaneously per­
meated by the encompassing, or else it is as good as lost.2
2 Karl Jaspers, Philosophy o f  Existence, trans. Richard Grabau (Philadelphia: 
University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 22.
3 ibid., p. 18.
Briefly put, I can attain the encompassing only by taking the existen­
tial leap from the immanence in which I am trapped to transcendence. 
In the leap to transcendence I become free. The encompassing to which 
I transcend is in no sense of the word any kind of being.
The encompassing always merely announces itself—in present 
objects and within horizons—but it never becomes an object. 
Never appearing to us itself, it is that wherein everything else 
appears. It is also that due to which all things not merely are 
what they immediately seem to be, but remain transparent.3
The encompassing is no particular being or thing, but that within 
which all things are. The fact that things are not what they immediately 
seem to be, but are transparent, means that things offer access to the en­
compassing. We do not need to climb beyond (transcend) things to en­
counter the encompassing, but in realizing the transparency of things 
we touch upon the encompassing or, as Jaspers also calls it, upon reali­
ty.
In our thinking, we would like to press on to the point where 
thought is identical with reality; but as we do so we experience 
the blow of thought rebounding from reality. As thinking 
transcends itself in the experience of this blow, it can make
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reality present to the thinker in an indirect and irreplaceable 
way.4
4 ibid., p. 77.
5 ibid., p. 28.
Reality rebuffs thinking, and yet thinking was able to touch reality 
for an instant. Why should reality rebuff thinking? Jaspers does not tell 
us here. He seems to accept it as a given fact. But perhaps we can con­
jecture that the nature of reality is not such that it permits prolonged 
contemplation. Perhaps reality does not exhibit the static persistence of 
a Platonic Form. Jaspers states that reality cannot be grasped directly 
with the categories of our thought. Thus we can say neither that it is 
some kind of substance nor being. To say that it is “ verbal” is not 
much help either.
Thought recoils from reality; it runs aground or gets stranded 
(scheitert) on reality. But reality was "there.”
Jaspers states that after breaking through to the realm of the encom­
passing through an existential leap we encounter a double possibility, a 
Kierkegaardian either-or. Either I remain blind to the encompassing 
and face to face with nothingness; or in the encompassing reality itself 
comes to meet me and I receive myself as a gift.
Both alternatives are possible. In losing the substance of my 
self I sense Nothingness. In being given to myself I sense the 
fullness of the encompassing. I can force neither of these 
two.5
To sum up, Jaspers countenances a transcendence that is neither be­
hind nor beyond things nor can it be flatly equated with things as they 
first seem to present themselves. Things must become transparent to al­
low reality to be touched upon. We shall return to this all too brief 
characterization after some discussion of Nishitani.
In this article “The Personal and the Impersonal in Religion,”  now 
incorporated into his book Religion and Nothingness, Nishitani tackles 
the difficult question of “ person” in God. Remarking that Nietzsche 
wanted to establish a new way of being human, Nishitani cautiously 
proceeds in the direction of finding something like a transpersonal
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dimension in God. For this he has at least one predecessor, Meister Eck­
hart with his notion of Godhead. The Godhead is beyond the trinity of 
persons. It is the place within God where God is not himself. Just as 
Heidegger sees ekstasis in human being and in temporality as such, 
Nishitani can say that ekstasis is applicable to the existence of God as 
well.
Citing a passage from Matthew, Nishitani sees the perfection of God 
in his nondifferentiating love which causes the rain to fall on the unjust 
as well as on the just. This selfless, compassionate love stems from 
God’s having emptied himself.
If the work of love has a personal characteristic (as I think it 
does), then it must be thought that God’s perfection (and love 
as perfection) is an even more fundamental thing than being a 
“ personal” entity, and that it is as the imitation or embodi­
ment of this perfection that the “ personal”  for the first time 
comes into being.6
The personal first comes into being as an imitation of transpersonal 
perfection. Nishitani states that the conception of man as a personal 
being is the highest idea of man hitherto attained. But this idea of man 
is person-centered, self-centered, ego-centered. With the ego cogito, 
Descartes trapped himself in self-immanence from which he was un­
able to extricate himself. Actually, he most likely did not even see the 
desirability or necessity of extricating himself.
For Nishitani, the personal appears from that which cannot itself be 
called personal. This he calls absolute nothingness. It contains no form 
of confinement. It is wholly other than person, but it is not some thing 
different from person. It brings person into being.
Absolute nothingness brings person into being. Yet it does not stand 
behind the person. Nishitani appeals to the derivation of the word per­
son from persona, mask. A person is literally per-sonare, a sounding 
through. When the person-centered mode of thinking is dropped, per­
sonality becomes the “ mask” of absolute nothingness.
Were nothingness thought apart from its mask, it would
6 Nishitani Keiji, Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: Univer­
sity o f  California Press, 1982), pp. 59-60.
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become an idea. Were we to deal with the mask apart from 
nothingness, personality would invariably be self-centered.7
If nothingness is thought by itself, thus objectified, it becomes an 
idea. It must be lived existentially, not just thought. The mask by itself 
falls back into the ego-centered idea of person. We need both absolute 
nothingness and mask. Then what is their relation?
Person or mask is an appearance of absolute nothingness. It is the 
only way absolute nothingness can appear at all. Needless to say, abso­
lute nothingness is not the noumenon or thing in itself behind the ap­
pearance. There is nothing behind the appearance.
For, while the self and the other as “ men” are entirely differ­
ent from each other, “ man”  (that is, conscious personality) 
is, in spite of all his living activities and modes of being, fun­
damentally an appearance which is presenting itself as “ man” 
in oneness with what is not “ man,”  i.e., with absolute 
nothingness.. Looked at from that aspect, every “ man” is, 
just as he is in his real suchness, not “ man,”  i.e., he is imper­
sonal. In other words, he is “ man”  as an appearance with 
“ nothing” behind it, of which he is an appearance.8
This involves the “ dialectic”  for which the twentieth century Kyoto 
school of Japan is well known: it has its roots in the Diamond Sutra’s 
formulation: A is not A, therefore A is A. In a more concrete formula­
tion: Before enlightenment mountains are mountains and rivers are 
rivers; during enlightenment mountains are not mountains and rivers 
are not rivers; after enlightenment mountains are really mountains and 
rivers are really rivers. The closest approximation to this in Western 
thought might be Heraclitus: not the fragment that states that we can­
not step in the same river twice, but the one that says: we step and we 
do not step in the same river twice.
Nishitani’s “ dialectic” plays itself out between absolute nothingness 
and person or mask. In the language of Western theology:
Subjective existence is established in ekstasis\ that is, it is established in
7 ibid., p. 72.
’ ibid., p. 78.
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the mode of being in which the self has within itself the place where it 
has stepped beyond itself. If we proceed a step farther, however, such a 
standpoint—ekstasis in this sense—proves to be still insufficient. There 
remains the more inclusive, more thorough position referred to before, 
that of absolute negation-szve-afiinnation. Ekstasis consists in the direc­
tion from self to the “ ground”  of self, from God to the ground of 
God; that is from being to nothingness. Negation-rive-aflinnation con­
sists in the direction from nothingness to being.9
Because person and mask are different from absolute nothingness or 
selfhood, they are entirely provisional and shadowlike; because they 
are wholly one with it, they are utterly real in their true suchness. We 
can perhaps find a weak Western analogy in the highly problematic rela­
tion of authenticity and inauthenticity in Heidegger’s Being and Time. 
Everyone is inauthentic, person and mask, a great deal of the time. But 
many break through to authenticity in intense, rare experiences of 
angst, anticipating death, or joy. Thus many people embody both 
authenticity and inauthenticity. Yet it is only authenticity and authen­
tic temporality that can lead us to the dimension of the meaning of 
being. An authentic person can understand inauthenticity; he often 
is it. An inauthentic person cannot understand authenticity; he has 
no conception of it. The fact that the Heidegger of Being and Time 
was still thinking in Kantian terms of the ground of possibility and 
embroiled himself in contradictory statements about which grounds 
which need not concern us here.10
Other “ instances” of this nonduality, which is not simply a flat equa- 
tional identity, might be Heidegger’s phrase from his later thought: the 
thinking of being (dasDenken des Seins). Here being functions both as 
an objective and as a subjective genitive; being is at once the object of 
thought, what is thought, and the subject of thought, what is thinking.
Another, still more paradoxical instance might be from the Heart 
Sutra: Form is emptiness, emptiness is form. This appears to be a flat- 
out contradiction until we realize that emptiness is not a thing and thus 
cannot stand in contradiction to anything. A further problem with 
both of these “ instances” is that they are not instances of anything
’ ibid., p. 79-80.
10 Cf. J. Stambaugh, The Finitude o f  Being (Albany: SUNY 1992).
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else. They simply do not instantiate anything else.
Adopting yet another interpretational stance, Nishitani speaks of 
Vimalaklrti suffering illness out of compassion because all sentient 
beings suffer illness. His illness is in no sense feigned nor should it be 
understood as a metaphor. His suffering is thoroughly real. Neverthe­
less, it is empty. This does not mean that behind the illness there is 
health. The real illness is, just as it is, emptiness.
Nishitani often cites at least three examples to explicate the theme of 
the Diamond Sutra: A is non-A; therefore A is A. The examples are: 
the eye cannot see itself; therefore it can see, i.e., function as an eye. 
This was also stated by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (5.633-5.6331). 
“ You say that this case is not altogether like that of the eye and the 
field of sight. But you really do not see the eye. And from nothing in 
the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye. For the 
field of sight has not a form like this: Eye.’* Nishitani continued: Fire 
cannot bum itself; therefore it can bum other things, i.e., function as 
fire. Water cannot wet itself: therefore it can wet other things, i.e., 
function as water.
These examples are viewed, not from the perspective of representa­
tion and logo?, but on the field of emptiness, on the field of things as 
they are in themselves (jitai).
We may remember that fire is really fire burning everything 
simply because fire in itself does not bum itself. In the notion 
of Jitai, the true reality of things is fully realized as it is. Thus 
for Nishitani, Jitai or, “ in itself’ is simply another term for 
sunyata.11
A thing “ in itself’ (yifai) is a thing not represented as an object, but 
seen, as it were, from within the thing.
A Western thinker who comes close to this manner in a somewhat 
less radical and precise way is Bergson.
And what I experience will depend neither on the point of 
view I may take up in regard to the object, since I am inside 
the object itself, nor on the symbols by which I may translate
11 Masao Abe, “Nishitani’s Challenge to Western Philosophy and Theology,’* 
paper delivered at the Annual Meeting o f the AAR, 1983, p. 32.
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the motion, since I have rejected all translations in order to 
possess the original. In short, I no longer grasp the movement 
from without, remaining where I am, but from where it is, 
from within, as it is in itself.12
12 Henri Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme (New York: Mac­
millan, 1955), pp. 21-22.
13 John C. Maraldo, “ Practice, Samadhi, Realization** in Eastern Buddhist XXV - 
1, P. 17.
Yet the Eastern mode of access to a thing goes beyond Bergson in 
that it not only does away with representation, but also abolishes the 
substantiality of the thing. It does not just “ get inside”  the thing as a 
substance. Thus the transcendence at stake here not only gets beyond 
representation, but also beyond substantiality, or what Heidegger 
polemicized against all this life as objective presence (Vorhandenheit).
Since much of Eastern thought engages in some kind of “ practice” 
that involves the body as well as the mind, we have here not only a rejec­
tion of any subject-object duality, but in some cases actual attempts to 
describe the experiential nature of that practice. This practice involves 
seated meditation (zazen) and also many “ artistic” activities such as 
calligraphy, the tea ceremony, the so-called “ martial” arts as well as 
the simple activities of daily life carried out in a collected, mindful 
way. Thus in speaking of samadhi (a state of mental concentration), 
Nishitani does not restrict that state, as one would expect, to human 
beings, but relates it to fire, a falling leaf, flying birds and swimming 
fish as well.
Samadhi is not ordinarily attributed to things like fire, birds, 
and fish. Nishitani’s text softens the surprise a bit by playing 
on the traditional Sino-Japanese character for samadhi, Jo, 
The Japanese verbal compound sadamaru has the meaning of 
being settled in a position. For Nishitani this meaning natural­
ly suggests being gathered together or concentrated, not scat­
tered, as the mind would be in state of samadhi. The meaning 
associated with the character Jo thus allows Nishitani to inter­
pret a state of mind as a state of being. Samadhi being is the 
mode of being or form of something as it is, determining it as 
the definite thing it uniquely is.13
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What is difficult for us Westerners is to grapple with the process of 
encountering things in a truly nonrepresentational, nonobjectifying 
way. It is one thing to say we must overcome the subject-object split, as 
many philosophers of this century are saying. It is another to actually 
“ see” something in a different way. The closest analogue in the West to 
this kind of “ seeing” is to be found in Plotinus.
The designation “ samadhi-being”  not only shifts our understanding 
of a supposed state of mind to a state of being; the conception of that 
state of being is thus radically altered. It is not “ being” in any substan­
tial sense. It cannot appropriately be called “ being” at all.
There is no reason not to presume instead that a samadhi is a 
be-ing and that people and other things are manifestations of 
that be-ing.14
Here “ be-ing” is conceived as an “ activity”  preceding and manifest­
ing both people and things. The terms Nishitani and the Kyoto school 
in general have for this activity are emptiness, absolute nothingness 
and suchness, to list a few of the dominant ones. Westerners are apt to 
be repelled by terms such as emptiness or nothingness, tending to find 
that they smack of nihilism. But since philosophers in this century seem 
to be trying to get out of substantialist metaphysics (Wittgenstein, 
Heidegger, also in his own way Derrida), we should perhaps at least be 
willing to try to see what is being discussed here.
In an attempt to lay foundations for a Buddhist-Christian dialogue, 
the Catholic theologian Hans Waldenfels quotes Leslie Dewart, The Fu­
ture o f a Belief.
In other words, the reality of being is not distinct from the 
being of real being; but reality as such is not being. Reality as 
such is that in which being can be real: reality is that in which 
existence can be and essence can be understood. . . . God is, 
to speak properly, not “ ultimate”  reality, since he is not the 
reality which exists “ after”  immediate reality: he is the reality 
in relation to which any other reality is real. God is reality as 
such. Thus, whatever is true of any being is true because it is 
real (and not only because it is). On the other hand, reality as
14 ibid., p. 17.
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such does not exist, and therefore the reality of any given 
being, or the reality of being as such is not the same as reality 
as such.15
This passage must come as a shock to us. Reality or God does not 
exist? But we must stop and consider what is meant here by the term 
“ exist.” To exist in the sense intended here means to persist statically as 
objectified substantialized being. For Buddhists nothing whatsoever 
exists in this sense since everything is impermanent and transitory. Ac­
cordingly, this meaning of existence is utterly deluded and stems solely 
from our habitual way of conceptualizing and objectifying things.
Reality does not exist. But then what “ is” it, or, if we cannot speak 
in this way, what does it “ do” ? What docs the word “ real” mean?
It is unfortunate that the etymology of the English word “ real” 
leads back to res, thing, as in the Cartesian res cogitans and res exten- 
sa. In his essay “ The Thing” Heidegger has made a very interesting 
and provocative attempt to think the thing as the locus where the Four­
fold of earth, the heaven, the godlike ones and mortals come to 
presence. We cannot pursue this attempt further here.
Another way to think reality is to contrast it Aristotelian fashion 
with potentiality. Reality is then the actualization of what is possible or 
potential. However, since the Buddhist theory of time as momentari­
ness or instantaneity undercuts any possible temporal substratum 
providing the continuity for such a transition from potentiality to ac­
tuality, this conception of reality is inappropriate for our purposes as 
well.
What constitutes an almost insurmountable barrier for Westerners 
here is our ingrained belief that what is real is what stays the same and 
persists throughout all possible change. If I meet a new friend and, af­
ter a few days or weeks, I find that this friendship for some reason will 
not work, I say that the friendship was not real. It did not last.
However, given the Buddhist conviction that everything is imperma­
nent, this belief is simply irrelevant. We must take a closer look at the 
Buddhist conception of negation as absolutely crucial to any under­
standing of reality. Negation is not something subservient to the pro-
15 Hans Waldenfels, Absolute Nothingness, trans. J. W. Heisig (New York: 1980), 
pp. 150-151.
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cess of synthesis, as in Hegel’s dialectic. Hegel speaks of “ the tremen­
dous power of the negative,” and makes it responsible for moving the 
whole historical process along.
The Buddhist understanding of negation cannot be conceived as an 
antithesis negating a thesis. Apart from the fact that anything like a the­
sis is lacking, negation is not something subsequent to a position or the­
sis representing an opposite position. Negation is simultaneous with 
the being of a thing, and constitutes an absolute contradiction. At the 
same time, there is nonduality involved in this absolute contradiction. 
Following its founder, Nishida Ki tar <5, the Kyoto school speaks of the 
self-identity of absolute contradiction. We need to get some concrete 
“ instances”  of this abstract formulation.
Let us return to Nishitani’s discussion of the eye not seeing itself, 
water not wetting itself and fire not burning itself. This negation is the 
very essence of a thing. It is not subsequent to the thing, nor is it in any 
sense another “ thing” representing an antithesis to the thing. Negation 
is the dimension of the thing that enables it to do what it does. If the 
eye saw itself, it could see nothing else. If fire burned itself, it would 
destroy itself and not be able to bum anything else.
Thus each thing is not simply a self-identical substance, but contains 
its own negation. Even this formulation is misleading. It is not the case 
that there is first of all a thing which then somehow gets negated. 
Rather, the “ negation” is, so to speak, simultaneously “ prior” to the 
thing and is what allows it to become manifest. In the language of the 
Heart Sutra, there is primordially emptiness (absolute nothingness, 
suchness) which, as it were, exudes and articulates form from itself. 
There is no causal or temporal relation involved. Emptiness and form 
are nondual. Form cannot be without emptiness and emptiness cannot 
“ be” or become manifest without form. One can perhaps say that 
emptiness is more fundamental, but it does not cause form or anything 
else. For this reason it is more appropriate to say that emptiness is all 
things than that all things are empty. Emptiness “ ises”  all things.
Reality and illusion are inseparable. They are to be grasped as 
the “ middle.” That is, on the field of emptiness, as we have 
tried to show, a thing is itself in not being itself. For it is an 
affirmation of each being on the home-ground of emptiness in­
herent in which is the identity of reality and illusion.16
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Reality and illusion, or emptiness and form, are nondual. This non­
duality is a ‘‘double exposure,*’ an image, incidentally, which Heideg­
ger hints at darkly in Vier Seminare to characterize the “ relation”  be­
tween Appropriation (Ereignis) and Framing (Gestell). One might try 
to express this in a slightly different way as the relation between a photo­
graph and its negative. When one looks at the negative—it is interest­
ing to note that the original “ photograph” or impression is called a 
negative—one sees a kind of shadowy outline of the photograph. Once 
one has seen the print, one can more or less see it in the negative. But, 
of course, this comparison, like all such comparisons, has its limita­
tions.
We want to move toward some kind of conclusion and reestablish a 
contact with Jaspers and transcendence. Both the encompassing and 
emptiness are not something beyond man and this world, but “ some­
thing” in which things are. Neither the encompassing nor emptiness is 
a something. This fact makes them extremely difficult to express in any 
language, a fact of which Jaspers with his “ ciphers” was keenly aware. 
Heidegger was trying to move in this direction when he began crossing 
out the word being (“ Styfi” ). Perhaps Jaspers was more successful in 
finding a word that names something that cannot be objectified or 
represented, and yet describes a kind of activity, that of encompassing.
Words which do not reveal reality, words which are nothing 
but subjective counterfeits, are called prapanda [diffuse, delu­
sive, more specifically, the attachment to the subjective and 
the objective as self-existent] by NagArjuna, mere wordplay 
which conceals and covers reality. Words which come at­
tached with reality, words that bespeak the “ in-itself”  are 
called desQna [instructive].16 7
16 The Religious Philosophy o f Nishitani Keiji, ed. Taitetsu Unno (Berkeley: 1989), 
p. 317.
17 The Religious Philosophy o f  Nishitani Keiji, p. 313.
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